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Evolutionary selection of beliefs

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  • Gans, Joshua S.

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  • Gans, Joshua S., 1995. "Evolutionary selection of beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 13-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:49:y:1995:i:1:p:13-17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    2. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-950, October.
    3. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
    4. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    5. W. Brian Arthur, 1992. "On Learning and Adaptation in the Economy," Working Paper 854, Economics Department, Queen's University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dufwenberg, Martin, 1997. "Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 45-50, November.

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