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Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility

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  • Stahl, Dale O.

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  • Stahl, Dale O., 1995. "Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 155-159, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:2:p:155-159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1988. "On The Order of Eliminating Dominated Strategies," Discussion Papers 789, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
    3. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
    4. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    5. Adam Brandenburger, 1992. "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 83-101, Fall.
    6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    7. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
    8. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    2. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games," Working Papers 287, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Friedenberg, Amanda & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2016. "Lexicographic beliefs and assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 955-985.
    5. Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020. "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-215.
    6. Christian W. Bach & Jérémie Cabessa, 2023. "Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium," Post-Print hal-04271274, HAL.
    7. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2017. "Comprehensive Rationalizability," Working Papers 174, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2019. "Comprehensive rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 185-202.
    9. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    10. Heifetz Aviad & Meier Martin & Schipper Burkhard C., 2021. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 525-556, June.
    11. Catonini, Emiliano & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2024. "Cautious belief and iterated admissibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    12. Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2011. "Common assumption of rationality," MPRA Paper 34441, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Perea, Andrés, 2011. "An algorithm for proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 510-525, June.
    14. Barelli, Paulo & Galanis, Spyros, 2013. "Admissibility and event-rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 21-40.
    15. Shuige Liu, 2021. "Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 119-148, March.
    16. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 465-492, April.
    17. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
    18. John Duggan & Michel Le Breton, 2014. "Choice-theoretic Solutions for Strategic Form Games," RCER Working Papers 580, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    19. Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.
    20. Bach, Christian W. & Cabessa, Jérémie, 2023. "Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).

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