Cautious Belief and Iterated Admissibility
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
epistemic game theory; iterated admissibility; weak dominance; lexicographic probability systems. jel: c72.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2023-07-10 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2023-07-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MFD-2023-07-10 (Microfinance)
- NEP-MIC-2023-07-10 (Microeconomics)
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