IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v240y2024ics0165176524002684.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • Sirguiado, Camilo J.

Abstract

Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Sirguiado, Camilo J., 2024. "A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:240:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002684
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524002684
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    2. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2021. "Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    3. Gabrielle Demange & David Gale & Marilda Sotomayor, 1987. "A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem," Post-Print halshs-00670980, HAL.
    4. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    5. Peter Chen & Michael Egesdal & Marek Pycia & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2016. "Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 202-214, May.
    6. Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023. "School choice with preference rank classes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
    2. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    3. Martin Van der Linden, 2019. "Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 609-645, June.
    4. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2017. "On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 27-43.
    5. Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions," Papers 2001.06166, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    6. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Turhan, Bertan, 2019. "Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 199-208.
    9. Chen, Peter & Egesdal, Michael & Pycia, Marek & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2016. "Median stable matchings in two-sided markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 64-69.
    10. YingHua He & Thierry Magnac, 2022. "Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2918-2950.
    11. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
    12. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
    13. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan, 2022. "Parallel markets in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 181-201.
    14. Diether W Beuermann & C Kirabo Jackson & Laia Navarro-Sola & Francisco Pardo, 2023. "What is a Good School, and Can Parents Tell? Evidence on the Multidimensionality of School Output," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(1), pages 65-101.
    15. Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min, 2018. "Matching in the large: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 295-317.
    16. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    17. Takumi Kongo, 2013. "On non-bossy matching rules in two-sided matching problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 303-311, December.
    18. Bó, Inácio & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2022. "The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 411-433.
    19. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
    20. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching markets; Stability; Manipulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:240:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002684. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.