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Lame duck law enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Losak, Shannon R.
  • Makowsky, Michael D.

Abstract

Election losses for incumbent sheriffs result in lame ducks who oversee local law enforcement for as long as 10 months before the next sheriff takes office. Monthly arrest rates decline 11% subsequent to a primary election loss and 20.3% after losing a general election; violent crime arrests drop 24.8% in the two months following a general election loss. Our results demonstrate the costs of electoral turnover where day-to-day duties are sensitive to effort and conscientiousness.

Suggested Citation

  • Losak, Shannon R. & Makowsky, Michael D., 2024. "Lame duck law enforcement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:238:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001903
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111707
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann & Alex Tabarrok, 2019. "To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 189-216.
    2. Baicker, Katherine & Jacobson, Mireille, 2007. "Finders keepers: Forfeiture laws, policing incentives, and local budgets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2113-2136, December.
    3. Callaway, Brantly & Sant’Anna, Pedro H.C., 2021. "Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 200-230.
    4. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2011. "More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 863-888.
    5. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 509-527, March.
    6. Mariana Lopes da Fonseca, 2020. "Lame Ducks and Local Fiscal Policy: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Portugal," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(626), pages 511-533.
    7. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2009. "Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 71-90, February.
    8. Aaron Chalfin & Benjamin Hansen & Emily K. Weisburst & Morgan C. Williams Jr., 2022. "Police Force Size and Civilian Race," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 139-158, June.
    9. Anna Harvey, 2020. "Fiscal Incentives in Law Enforcement," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 173-210.
    10. George Bulman, 2019. "Law Enforcement Leaders And The Racial Composition Of Arrests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(4), pages 1842-1858, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sheriffs; Elections; Lame duck;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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