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The political cycle of road traffic accidents

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  • Bertoli, Paola
  • Grembi, Veronica

Abstract

Road traffic accidents mean lost productivity and medical expenditures. We explain trends in traffic accidents as a function of the political cycle using municipal data from Italy. We show that during municipal election years, the accident rate increases by 1.5%, with a 2% increase in the injury rate but no effect on the fatality rate. The effects are stronger in the quarter prior to the election quarter, when the electoral campaign is at its zenith, and in the second quarter after the election for the new elected mayor. We show that this is the result of a decrease in tickets for traffic violations (rate and revenues) during election years. Our results are robustly driven by the municipal political cycle defined in different ways, and their magnitude and direction are not explained by the spillover effects between municipalities. Proximity to a national police station reduces the impact of local elections on injury rates.

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  • Bertoli, Paola & Grembi, Veronica, 2021. "The political cycle of road traffic accidents," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:76:y:2021:i:c:s0167629621000205
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102435
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    Cited by:

    1. Pires Abdullah & Tibor Sipos, 2022. "Drivers’ Behavior and Traffic Accident Analysis Using Decision Tree Method," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-11, September.
    2. Cipullo, Davide & Le Moglie, Marco, 2022. "To vote, or not to vote? Electoral campaigns and the spread of COVID-19," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    3. Yau‐Huo (Jimmy) Shr & Feng‐An Yang, 2023. "Public health crisis and risky road behaviors," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(6), pages 1205-1219, June.
    4. Leonzio Rizzo & Massimiliano Ferraresi & Riccardo Secomandi, 2021. "Electoral incentives, investment in roads, and safety on local roads," Working Papers 20210710, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    5. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Leonzio Rizzo & Riccardo Secomandi, 2021. "Electoral incentives, investment in roads, and safety on local roads," Working papers 107, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Road traffic accidents; Political cycle; Municipalities; Tickets for traffic violations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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