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The optimal role model

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  • Duc, Julien
  • Poirier, Côme

Abstract

Comparison with peers, including role models, is an essential force driving individual’s behaviors. We study how the introduction of such a role model can influence individual’s action and how to drive agents to exert maximal effort through comparative emulation. We consider a planner whose goal is to maximize the effort exerted by an agent. The agent’s utility is composed of a direct and a relative component. The planner can hire a role model to induce competition through comparison and increase the agent’s effort. We show that the agent’s response to the role model effort exhibits two distinct behaviors : emulation and discouragement. These two behaviors depend on whether the role model effort is above a certain threshold. In addition, we show that this response is discontinuous at the threshold, suggesting important implications for education and organizational design.

Suggested Citation

  • Duc, Julien & Poirier, Côme, 2024. "The optimal role model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:234:y:2024:i:c:s0165176523004950
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111469
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Relative utility; Social comparison; Emulation; Role model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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