Impartial Nominations for a Prize
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DOI: ECTA10523
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Cited by:
- Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2017.
"Balancing the power to appoint officers,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 189-203.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2015. "Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers," Working Papers 696, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Pablo Amorós, 2020.
"Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 833-849, September.
- Pablo Amorós, 2018. "Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition," Working Papers 2018-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024.
"Designing Scientific Grants,"
NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, volume 4,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024. "Designing Scientific Grants," NBER Working Papers 32668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tamura, Shohei, 2016.
"Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 41-46.
- Shohei Tamura, 2015. "Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes," ISER Discussion Paper 0925, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2021. "Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
- Edelman, Paul H. & Por, Attila, 2021. "A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 443-451.
- Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubinski, 2023. "Selecting a Winner with External Referees," Working Papers 99, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
- Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.
- Matthew Olckers & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey," Papers 2210.01984, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
- Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Optimal Impartial Correspondences," Papers 2301.04544, arXiv.org.
- Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser, 2023. "Simple Allocation with Correlated Types," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_486, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2019. "Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 26-38.
- C. Gizem Korpeoglu, 2018. "Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: axiomatic characterizations," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 41-53, April.
- Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
- Shohei Tamura & Shinji Ohseto, 2014. "Impartial nomination correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 47-54, June.
- Federico Fioravanti, 2024. "Expert Classification Aggregation," Papers 2409.11033, arXiv.org.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2022. "Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
- Andrew Mackenzie, 2020. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 713-743, April.
- Amorós, Pablo, 2020. "Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
- Javier Cembrano & Svenja M. Griesbach & Maximilian J. Stahlberg, 2023. "Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights," Papers 2310.14991, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
- Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection," Papers 2305.09998, arXiv.org.
- Cembrano, Javier & Fischer, Felix & Hannon, David & Klimm, Max, 2024. "Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 203-224.
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