Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109437
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More about this item
Keywords
Resource allocation; Allocative efficiency; Asymmetric information; Mechanism design without transfers;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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