Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-09-23 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2024-09-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2024-09-23 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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