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Nudging with your child’s education. A field experiment on collecting municipal dues when enforcement is scant

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  • Sutter, Charlotte
  • Rosenberger, Wolfram
  • Sutter, Matthias

Abstract

We study whether nudging can improve payment morale for taxes and dues when enforcement through public institutions is low because of social reasons. In a natural field experiment involving the parents of children who attend lessons in a municipal music school, we find that nudging parents with appeals to children’s education improves the punctual payment of dues by about five percentage points, which is considerable given a base rate of only 48%. The effect persists even when the nudge is removed half a year later.

Suggested Citation

  • Sutter, Charlotte & Rosenberger, Wolfram & Sutter, Matthias, 2020. "Nudging with your child’s education. A field experiment on collecting municipal dues when enforcement is scant," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300999
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2013. "Testing Enforcement Strategies In The Field: Threat, Moral Appeal And Social Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 634-660, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Field experiment; Municipal dues; Payment morale; Nudging; Education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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