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Using loss aversion to incentivize energy efficiency in a principal–agent context — Evidence from a field experiment

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  • Hoffmann, Christin
  • Thommes, Kirsten

Abstract

Promoting energy-efficient behavior of agents in a principal–agent context simultaneously decreases costs for firms and mitigates CO2 emissions. Along this line, we analyze the effect of incentive framing on energy-efficient driving behavior. Our results contribute to the understanding of the drawbacks of loss framing. In a situation with persistent labor market relations, an extremely low bonus, and heterogeneous prior performance, the introduction of a bonus framed as a gain outperforms that of a bonus framed as a loss.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoffmann, Christin & Thommes, Kirsten, 2020. "Using loss aversion to incentivize energy efficiency in a principal–agent context — Evidence from a field experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:189:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300264
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108984
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    2. Jonathan de Quidt, 2017. "Your Loss is my Gain: A Recruitment Experiment with Framed Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 6326, CESifo Group Munich.
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    4. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2015. "Framing Of Incentives And Effort Provision," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56, pages 917-938, August.
    6. Tanjim Hossain & John A. List, 2012. "The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing Productivity Using Simple Framing Manipulations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(12), pages 2151-2167, December.
    7. Roland Fryer & Steven Levitt & John List & Sally Sadoff, 2012. "Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00591, The Field Experiments Website.
    8. Hong, Fuhai & Hossain, Tanjim & List, John A., 2015. "Framing manipulations in contests: A natural field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 372-382.
    9. Thaler, Richard, 1980. "Toward a positive theory of consumer choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 39-60, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pau Balart & Lara Ezquerra & Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz, 2022. "Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple-choice tests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1268-1297, September.
    2. Hoffmann, Christin & Thommes, Kirsten, 2024. "Can leaders motivate employees’ energy-efficient behavior with thoughtful communication?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    3. Hoffmann, Christin & Thommes, Kirsten, 2020. "Can digital feedback increase employee performance and energy efficiency in firms? Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 49-65.
    4. Lorenz Götte & Egon Tripodi, 2022. "Social Recognition: Experimental Evidence from Blood Donors," CESifo Working Paper Series 9719, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy-efficient behavior; Loss aversion; Field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • Q49 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Other
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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