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A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests

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  • Klunover, Doron

Abstract

Rent dissipation is a measure of the social loss in rent-seeking contests and therefore is the main source of interest in the rent-seeking literature. We derive narrow bounds for the amount of rent dissipation in a sequential lottery contest with n identical players and show that it is larger than in the corresponding simultaneous contest. Hence, sequential moves in contests increase the social loss from rent-seeking behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Klunover, Doron, 2018. "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 90-93.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:90-93
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
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    3. Warneryd, Karl, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May.
    4. Avinash Dixit, 2008. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 431-438, Springer.
    5. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.
    6. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    7. Roger Myerson & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Population uncertainty in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 469-474, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lottery contests; Sequential contests; Dissipation in contests;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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