Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005.
"Asymmetric contests with general technologies,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Avinash Dixit, 2008.
"Strategic Behavior in Contests,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 431-438,
Springer.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
- Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.
- Leininger, Wolfgang, 1993. "More Efficient Rent-Seeking--A Munchhausen Solution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 43-62, January.
- Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Stackelberg and Marshall," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 69-82, March.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2012.
"Fully aggregative games,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 631-633.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2009. "Fully Aggregative Games," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2009-505, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Marco Serena, 2017. "Sequential contests revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 131-144, October.
- Morgan, John, 2003. "Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2003. "Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 1-25, October.
- Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 2000. "Sequential Rent Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 219-228, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024.
"Optimal sequential contests,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
- Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2021. "Optimal Sequential Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 15855, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2020. "Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, David, 2020. "Task arrangement in team competitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Klunover, Doron, 2018. "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 90-93.
- Arthur B. Nelson & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019.
"Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study,"
Working Papers
wp2019_11_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Arthur B. Nelson & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2024. "Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study," Papers 2409.06230, arXiv.org.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Sandra Ludwig, 2012.
"Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 341-355, December.
- Ludwig, Sandra, 2011. "Contests – A comparison of timing and information structures," Discussion Papers in Economics 12209, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.
- Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024.
"Optimal sequential contests,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
- Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2021. "Optimal Sequential Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 15855, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Kolmar, Martin, 2017.
"Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 120-139.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Martin Kolmar, 2013. "Distributional Preferences in Probabilistic and Share Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4184, CESifo.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020.
"Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous Timing in the Presence of Non-Monotonicities," Post-Print hal-02056492, HAL.
- Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Zhou, J., 2007.
"In Litigation : How Far do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead,"
Discussion Paper
2007-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation : How Far do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?," Discussion Paper 2007-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Jindapon, Paan & Yang, Zhe, 2017. "Risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 69-84.
- de Roos, Nicolas & Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 259-283.
- Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
- Oliver Gürtler, 2010.
"Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm,"
Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 62(4), pages 359-377, October.
- Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 169, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs," Working Papers 1106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Kyung Hwan Baik & Jong Hwa Lee, 2013. "Endogenous Timing In Contests With Delegation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2044-2055, October.
- Yohan Pelosse, 2024. "Sequential Contest when the Precision of Observation is Endogenous," Working Papers 2024-02, Swansea University, School of Management.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012.
"Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models," CERDI Working papers halshs-00553119, HAL.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Post-Print halshs-00689738, HAL.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation : How Far do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead," Other publications TiSEM 84767819-ad3f-431f-a39a-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2014.
"Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 893-923, December.
- Sela, Aner & Segev, Ella, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8183, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007.
"The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
- Morgan, John & Várdy, Felix, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0s6752rf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
Aggregative games; Sequential contests; Subgame perfect equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:126-129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.