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Impunity under pressure: On the role of emotions as a commitment device

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  • Balafoutas, Loukas
  • Jaber-Lopez, Tarek

Abstract

We examine the emotional component of rejections in the Impunity Game in a dual-process framework. Subjects reject unfair offers more frequently when decisions are taken under time pressure. This supports the role of emotions as a commitment device.

Suggested Citation

  • Balafoutas, Loukas & Jaber-Lopez, Tarek, 2018. "Impunity under pressure: On the role of emotions as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 112-114.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:112-114
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 113-115, May.
    5. Recalde, María P. & Riedl, Arno & Vesterlund, Lise, 2018. "Error-prone inference from response time: The case of intuitive generosity in public-good games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-147.
    6. David G. Rand & Joshua D. Greene & Martin A. Nowak, 2012. "Spontaneous giving and calculated greed," Nature, Nature, vol. 489(7416), pages 427-430, September.
    7. Lindner, Florian & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11–20 money request game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 542-545.
    8. Sutter, Matthias & Kocher, Martin & Strau[ss], Sabine, 2003. "Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 341-347, December.
    9. Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami, 1995. "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 95-121, July.
    10. Straub, Paul G. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1995. "An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 345-364, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anabel Doñate-Buendía & Hernán Bejarano & Aurora García-Gallego, 2022. "Gender identification and stake size effects in the Impunity Game," Working Papers 2022/08, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emotions; Commitment model; Impunity game; Time pressure; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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