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Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third-Party Intervention

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  • SHANE SANDERS
  • BHAVNEET WALIA

Abstract

This paper employs a contest approach to study a class of territorial conflicts in which conflict-related arming is (endogenously) destructive of the contest prize. Of particular focus is the effect of endogenously destructive conflict arming upon conflict intensity and utility levels among primary parties to conflict. Also of interest are implications of endogenous destruction upon third-party welfare effect in conflict. As compared to the case of a fixed-prize conflict, we find starkly different arming and welfare outcomes in the case of an endogenously destructive conflict. We also find stark differences in third-party effect under this distinct setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Shane Sanders & Bhavneet Walia, 2014. "Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third-Party Intervention," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(4), pages 606-619, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:16:y:2014:i:4:p:606-619
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jpet.12076
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:69:y:2002:i:274:p:185-206 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Patrick M. Regan, 2002. "Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 55-73, February.
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    6. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. "Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damian S. Damianov & Shane Sanders & Anil Yildizparlak, 2018. "Asymmetric endogenous prize contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 435-453, October.
    2. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2017. "Endogenous Destruction In Conflict: Theory And Extensions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 479-500, January.
    3. Chang, Yang-Ming & Sanders, Shane & Walia, Bhavneet, 2015. "The costs of conflict: A choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-65.
    4. Dong, Zhiqiang & Zhang, Yongjing, 2016. "A sequential game of endowment effect and natural property rights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 108-111.
    5. Yang-Ming Chang & Manaf Sellak, 2024. "Conflict and agreement in the collective choice of trade policies: implications for interstate disputes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 103-135, April.
    6. Vincent Auger & Yang-Ming Chang & Shane Sanders, 2017. "Do Humanitarian Interventions Help Humanity? An Economic Analysis of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Norm in Intrastate Conflicts," Journal of Development Innovations, KarmaQuest International, vol. 1(2), pages 1-14, October.
    7. Yang‐Ming Chang & Shih‐Jye Wu, 2020. "Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1338-1371, April.
    8. Yang-Ming Chang & Manaf Sellak, 2019. "A game-theoretic analysis of international trade and political conflict over external territories," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 209-228, June.

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