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One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information

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  • Tomoya Nakamura

Abstract

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomoya Nakamura, 2014. "One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information," ISER Discussion Paper 0908r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0908r
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    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0908R.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1919-1966, November.
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    6. Arato, Hiroki & Hori, Takeo & Nakamura, Tomoya, 2021. "Endogenous information acquisition and the partial announcement policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
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    10. repec:dpr:wpaper:0892 is not listed on IDEAS
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