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Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games

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  • Eray Cumbul

Abstract

We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games and it decreases in the remaining three games. Finally, we characterize the conditions for payoffs and welfare to increase with more precise private or public information. We also provide robustness checks when the values are private.

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  • Eray Cumbul, 2022. "Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 441-479, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:441-79
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190059
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1919-1966, November.
    2. Nakamura, Tomoya, 2015. "One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 27-30.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jihad C. Elnaboulsi & Wassim Daher & Yiğit Sağlam, 2023. "Environmental taxation, information precision, and information sharing," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 301-341, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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