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Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: The difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value

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  • Casajus, André
  • Huettner, Frank

Abstract

We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2014. "Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: The difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 167-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:167-169
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 263-267.
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    4. Kamijo, Yoshio & Kongo, Takumi, 2012. "Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 638-646.
    5. Yoshio Kamijo & Takumi Kongo, 2010. "Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 563-571, October.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Solidarity; Nullifying player; Dummifying player; Equal division value; Equal surplus division value; Monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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