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Fighting corruption: To precommit or not?

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  • Ngendakuriyo, Fabien
  • Zaccour, Georges

Abstract

We consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players. We characterize open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and find that, whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy, civil society is better off precommitting to fight corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngendakuriyo, Fabien & Zaccour, Georges, 2013. "Fighting corruption: To precommit or not?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 149-154.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:149-154
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ngendakuriyo, Fabien & Zaccour, Georges, 2017. "Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 30-36.
    2. Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2022. "A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22006r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Jun 2023.
    3. Denis Claude & Mabel Tidball, 2020. "Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Pierre-Olivier Pineau & Simon Sigué & Sihem Taboubi (ed.), Games in Management Science, pages 165-186, Springer.
    4. V. N. Kolokoltsov & O. A. Malafeyev, 2017. "Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 34-47, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Differential games; Commitments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues

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