IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v85y2017icp30-36.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?

Author

Listed:
  • Ngendakuriyo, Fabien
  • Zaccour, Georges

Abstract

We consider a dynamic game with a corrupt government and multiple civil society organizations as the players. We characterize feedback Stackelberg equilibria with the government as leader and two civil society organizations as the followers who can compete or cooperate when deciding their monitoring efforts. Overall, the numerical results show that a cooperation yields a higher institutional quality and output than does the competitive regime as it does for both individuals and government payoff while the players invest less efforts. In a nutshell, we found that it is in the best interest of both the government and civil society organizations that the latter coordinate their actions and efforts and cooperate in fight against corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngendakuriyo, Fabien & Zaccour, Georges, 2017. "Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 30-36.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:85:y:2017:i:c:p:30-36
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489616301573
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    2. Wydick,Bruce, 2008. "Games in Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521687157, October.
    3. Prabir De, 2010. "Governance, Institutions, and Regional Infrastructure in Asia," Working Papers id:3029, eSocialSciences.
    4. De, Prabir, 2010. "Governance, Institutions, and Regional Infrastructure in Asia," ADBI Working Papers 183, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    5. Ngendakuriyo, Fabien & Zaccour, Georges, 2013. "Fighting corruption: To precommit or not?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 149-154.
    6. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    7. Easterly, William, 2001. "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(4), pages 687-706, July.
    8. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    9. Prabir De, 2010. "Governance, Institutions, and Regional Infrastructure in Asia," Governance Working Papers 22878, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    10. Fabien Ngendakuriyo, 2013. "Institutional Quality and Growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(1), pages 157-183, February.
    11. Philippe Aghion, 2005. "Growth and Institutions," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 3-18, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2022. "A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22006r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Jun 2023.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pi, Jiancai & Fan, Yanwei, 2021. "Institutional change and wage inequality," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 440-452.
    2. Prabir De, 2010. "Does Governance Matter for Enhancing Trade? Empirical Evidence from Asia," Governance Working Papers 22792, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    3. repec:cte:whrepe:wp08-04 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2009. "Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1489-1520, July.
    5. Feng, Xunan & Johansson, Anders C. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2014. "Political participation and entrepreneurial initial public offerings in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 269-285.
    6. repec:elg:eechap:15325_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Danuta Milaszewicz & Kesra Nermend, 2020. "Application of Vector Measure Construction Methods to Estimate Quality of Institutions: Nations in Transition," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 2), pages 16-29.
    8. Marek Litzman & Martin Machay, 2016. "Legal Regulations of Production Plans: Are They Unproductive?," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 64(6), pages 2039-2046.
    9. Sen, Kunal, 2013. "The Political Dynamics of Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 71-86.
    10. Fogel, Kathy & Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2008. "Big business stability and economic growth: Is what's good for General Motors good for America?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-108, July.
    11. Wafa Ghardallou & Dorsaf Sridi, 2020. "Democracy and Economic Growth: a Literature Review," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 11(3), pages 982-1002, September.
    12. Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May.
    13. Accinelli, Elvio & Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez, 2012. "Corruption driven by imitative behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 84-87.
    14. Krieger, Tim & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2016. "Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality, economic freedom and democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 115-132.
    15. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 178-218, January.
    16. Pyastolov Sergey & Shitenkova Elena, 2012. "Power – property core of economic development: the cases of Russia and South Korea," Journal of Economic Regulation Journal of Economic Regulation (Вопросы регулирования экономики), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 3(4), pages 93-108.
    17. Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger Woessmann, 2008. "The Role of Cognitive Skills in Economic Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 607-668, September.
    18. Serkan Degirmenci, 2011. "Do Institutions Matter for Regional Economic Growth and Development? The Case of Turkey," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1374, European Regional Science Association.
    19. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship," Working Paper Series 716, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    20. Timilsina,Govinda R. & Sahoo,Pravakar & Dash,Ranjan Kumar, 2022. "Why Do Indian States Differ in Their Infrastructure Development ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10086, The World Bank.
    21. Kaznacheev, Peter, 2013. "Resource Rents and Economic Growth: Economic and institutional development in countries with a high share of income from the sale of natural resources. Analysis and recommendations based on internatio," EconStor Research Reports 121950, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    22. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Shu, Pei-Gi & Chiu, Shean-Bii, 2013. "Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1079-1101.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:85:y:2017:i:c:p:30-36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.