Efficient unemployment insurance and the cost of borrowing
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.02.001
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Christopher D. Carroll, 1997.
"Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 1-55.
- Christopher D Carroll, 1990. "Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive 371, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Aug 1996.
- Christopher D. Carroll, 1996. "Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis," NBER Working Papers 5788, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Shimer & Iván Werning, 2007.
"Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 1145-1185.
- Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2006. "Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 12618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rasmus Lentz, 2009.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(1), pages 37-57, January.
- Rasmus Lentz, 2003. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings," CAM Working Papers 2004-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
- Raj Chetty, 2008.
"Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
- Raj Chetty, 2008. "Erratum: Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1197-1197, December.
- Gruber, Jonathan, 1997. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 192-205, March.
- Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
- Raj Chetty, 2008.
"Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
- Chetty, Raj, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Scholarly Articles 9751256, Harvard University Department of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 2012.
"Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data,"
NBER Working Papers
18433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chetty, Nadarajan & Finkelstein, Amy Nadya, 2013. "Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data," Scholarly Articles 34330197, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fadlon, Itzik & Nielsen, Torben Heien, 2019.
"Household labor supply and the gains from social insurance,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 18-28.
- Itzik Fadlon & Torben Heien Nielsen, 2016. "Household Labor Supply and the Gains from Social Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Social Insurance Programs (Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar, TAPES), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonas Kolsrud & Camille Landais & Peter Nilsson & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2018.
"The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(4-5), pages 985-1033, April.
- Peter Nilsson & Johannes Spinnewijn & Camille Landais, 2015. "The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden," 2015 Meeting Papers 279, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Kolsrud, Jonas & Landais, Camille & Nilsson, Peter & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2015. "The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden," IZA Discussion Papers 9185, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Kolsrud, Jonas & Landais, Camille & Nilsson, J. Peter & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2018. "The optimal timing of unemployment benefits: theory and evidence from Sweden," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86379, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- J. Kolsrud & Camille Landais & P. Nilsson & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2015. "The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden," STICERD - Public Economics Programme Discussion Papers 25, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Juliana MESÉN VARGAS & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2017.
"Is there always a trade-off between insurance and incentives? The case of unemployment with subsistence constraints,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES
2017014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Juliana Mesén Vargas & Bruno Van der Linden, 2018. "Is there always a Trade-off between Insurance and Incentives? The Case of Unemployment with Subsistence Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 7044, CESifo.
- Mesén Vargas, Juliana & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2017. "Is There Always a Trade-off between Insurance and Incentives? The Case of Unemployment with Subsistence Constraints," IZA Discussion Papers 11034, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Peter Ganong & Pascal Noel, 2019.
"Consumer Spending during Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(7), pages 2383-2424, July.
- Peter Ganong & Pascal J. Noel, 2019. "Consumer Spending During Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications," NBER Working Papers 25417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Ganong & Pascal Noel, 2019. "Consumer Spending During Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications," Working Papers 2019-006, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Thomas Crossley & Hamish Low, 2011.
"Borrowing constraints, the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(6), pages 658-687, December.
- Thomas F. Crossley & Hamish W. Low, 2004. "Borrowing Constraints, the Cost of Precautionary Saving, and Unemployment Insurance," Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population Research Reports 391, McMaster University.
- Thomas F. Crossley & Hamish W. Low, 2005. "Borrowing Constraints, the Cost of Precautionary Saving, and Unemployment Insurance," Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population Research Papers 125, McMaster University.
- Thomas Crossley & Hamish Low, 2005. "Borrowing constraints, the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance," IFS Working Papers W05/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Andreas Haller & Stefan Staubli & Josef Zweimüller, 2024.
"Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(1), pages 79-110, January.
- Staubli, Stefan & Haller, Andreas & Zweimüller, Josef, 2020. "Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15121, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andreas Haller & Stefan Staubli & Josef Zweimüller, 2020. "Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits," NBER Working Papers 27602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Haller, Andreas & Staubli, Stefan & Zweimüller, Josef, 2020. "Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?," IZA Discussion Papers 13539, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller, 2020. "Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?," Cahiers de recherche / Working Papers 5, Institut sur la retraite et l'épargne / Retirement and Savings Institute.
- Lawson, Nicholas, 2015.
"Social program substitution and optimal policy,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 13-27.
- Nicholas Lawson, 2014. "Social Program Substitution and Optimal Policy," AMSE Working Papers 1417, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 16 May 2014.
- Nicholas Lawson, 2014. "Social Program Substitution and Optimal Policy," Working Papers halshs-00993127, HAL.
- Kory Kroft & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2016.
"Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 1092-1124.
- Kory Kroft & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2011. "Should Unemployment Insurance Vary With the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 17173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kroft, Kory & Notowidigdo, Matthew J., 2012. "Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence," CLSSRN working papers clsrn_admin-2012-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 29 Oct 2012.
- Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter, 2016.
"The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 547-581, October.
- Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter, 2016. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation," NBER Working Papers 22564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vargas Juliana Mesén & Linden Bruno Van der, 2019. "Why Cash Transfer Programs Can Both Stimulate and Slow Down Job Finding," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Sciendo & Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, June.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010.
"Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance,"
NBER Chapters, in: Income Taxation, Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), pages 85-114,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 85-114, May.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2008. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Saez, Emmanuel & Chetty, Nadarajan, 2010. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," Scholarly Articles 9696326, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Joanne W. Hsu & David A. Matsa & Brian T. Melzer, 2014. "Positive Externalities of Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance and Consumer Credit," NBER Working Papers 20353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fagereng, Andreas & Onshuus, Helene & Torstensen, Kjersti N., 2024.
"The consumption expenditure response to unemployment: Evidence from Norwegian households,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
- Fagereng, Andreas & Onshuus, Helene & Næss Torstensen, Kjersti, 2023. "The Consumption Expenditure Response to Unemployment: Evidence from Norwegian Households," CEPR Discussion Papers 18550, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Walter Nicholson & Karen Needels, "undated". "The EUC08 Program in Theoretical and Historical Perspective," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 9046cb11c3aa44c8a036a6e38, Mathematica Policy Research.
- Nicholas Lawson, 2023. "Optimal unemployment policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 675-692, July.
- Elira Kuka, 2020.
"Quantifying the Benefits of Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance and Health,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 490-505, July.
- Elira Kuka, 2018. "Quantifying the Benefits of Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance and Health," NBER Working Papers 24766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elira Kuka, 2018. "Quantifying the Benefits of Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance and Health," Departmental Working Papers 1808, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
- Kuka, Elira, 2018. "Quantifying the Benefits of Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance and Health," IZA Discussion Papers 11629, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- François Gerard & Joana Naritomi, 2021.
"Job Displacement Insurance and (the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(3), pages 899-942, March.
- François Gerard & Joana Naritomi, 2019. "Job Displacement Insurance and (the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing," NBER Working Papers 25749, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Naritomi, Joana & ,, 2019. "Job Displacement Insurance and (the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing," CEPR Discussion Papers 13676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francois Gerard & Joana Naritomi, 2019. "Job displacement insurance and (the lack of) consumption-smoothing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7625, CESifo.
- Gerard, François & Naritomi, Joana, 2021. "Job displacement insurance and (the lack of) consumption-smoothing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107127, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jean‐Baptiste Michau, 2021.
"On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 382-414, January.
- Jean-Baptiste Michau, 2013. "On the Provision of Insurance Against Search-Induced Wage Fluctuations," Working Papers hal-00850547, HAL.
- Jean-Baptiste Michau, 2014. "On the Provision of Insurance Against Search-Induced Wage Fluctuations," 2014 Meeting Papers 112, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
Keywords
Unemployment insurance; Welfare; Heterogeneous agents;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:2:p:136-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.