Bargaining with many players: A limit result
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- Klaus Kultti & Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result," Discussion Papers 32, Aboa Centre for Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
- Fishburn, Peter C & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Time Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 677-694, October.
- Kultti Klaus & Vartiainen Hannu, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, November.
- Joseph M. Ostroy & Louis Makowski, 2001. "Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 479-535, June.
- Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
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Cited by:
- Jiawei Li & Tianxiang Cui & Graham Kendall, 2022. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(15), pages 1-9, July.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "A conflict-free arbitration scheme in a large population," Discussion Papers 34, Aboa Centre for Economics.
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Keywords
Non-cooperative bargaining Stationary equilibrium Replication Walrasian market;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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