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Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market

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  • Joseph M. Ostroy
  • Louis Makowski

Abstract

From the perspective of the Walrasian general equilibrium model, entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign. Can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior? Many would say no, but we argue the contrary. Indeed, we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to, rather than a detour from, such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives. The trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means. Starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium, we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist, seeking out profit potentials wherever he can.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph M. Ostroy & Louis Makowski, 2001. "Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 479-535, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:39:y:2001:i:2:p:479-535
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.2.479
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M., 1992. "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies : Characterization and existence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-35.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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