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A framework for evaluating collective action and informal institutional dynamics under a resource management policy of decentralization

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  • Rahman, H.M. Tuihedur
  • Hickey, Gordon M.
  • Sarker, Swapan Kumar

Abstract

The decentralization of resource property rights has become an increasingly popular policy in many natural resource-dependent communities of the developing world. However, the success of this policy approach depends on both collective action and institutionalization. It is therefore important to evaluate collective action and institutionalization where the process of property rights decentralization is in progress. This paper presents a modified version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework designed to analyze the decentralization of property rights and the collective action of community members to obtain these rights. It describes a three-phased framework for analyzing: i) the government property right decentralization policy, ii) the stock of capital assets in the community required to achieve property rights by initiating collective action, and iii) the development of an informal institution for effective property right distribution in the community. Finally, to demonstrate its utility to collective action research, we present a case study application of our modified framework to the fisheries property right decentralization policy of the Bangladesh government and the subsequent collective action of a wetland-dependent community.

Suggested Citation

  • Rahman, H.M. Tuihedur & Hickey, Gordon M. & Sarker, Swapan Kumar, 2012. "A framework for evaluating collective action and informal institutional dynamics under a resource management policy of decentralization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 32-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:83:y:2012:i:c:p:32-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.08.018
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