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Inequality, differential technology for resource extraction and voluntary collective action in commons

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  • Mukhopadhyay, Lekha

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  • Mukhopadhyay, Lekha, 2004. "Inequality, differential technology for resource extraction and voluntary collective action in commons," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 215-230, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:215-230
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
    2. van Koppen, Barbara & Parthasarathy, R. & Safiliou, Constantina, 2002. "Poverty dimensions of irrigation management transfer in large-scale canal irrigation in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, India," IWMI Research Reports 44564, International Water Management Institute.
    3. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    4. Dubra, Juan, 2001. "An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 131-136, November.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    6. Jeff Dayton-Johnson & Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Inequality And Conservation On The Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 577-602, July.
    7. Itaya, Jun-ichi & de Meza, David & Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "In praise of inequality: public good provision and income distribution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 289-296, December.
    8. Busch, Lutz Alexander & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2003. "Power and Inefficient Institutions," Economics Discussion Papers 8862, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    9. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1998. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons, Part II: The Regulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, January.
    10. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rahman, H.M. Tuihedur & Hickey, Gordon M. & Sarker, Swapan Kumar, 2012. "A framework for evaluating collective action and informal institutional dynamics under a resource management policy of decentralization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 32-41.

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