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A bargaining experiment under weak property rights, with implications for indigenous title claims

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  • Berry, Kevin
  • Delmond, Anthony R.
  • Morin Chassé, Rémi
  • Strandholm, John C.
  • Shogren, Jason F.

Abstract

We explore how three parties bargain over a windfall created by a development project given negative spillover on only one party's property. We compare how weak and strong property rights affect negotiation outcomes and fairness. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With weak rights, parties reimburse costs and divide surplus so the developer is simply indifferent, nothing more. These results are meaningful for Indigenous in Canada: without strong property rights, the Crown's duty to consult may still yield dissatisfaction because of improper compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Berry, Kevin & Delmond, Anthony R. & Morin Chassé, Rémi & Strandholm, John C. & Shogren, Jason F., 2022. "A bargaining experiment under weak property rights, with implications for indigenous title claims," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:198:y:2022:i:c:s0921800922001197
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107457
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    Cited by:

    1. Zapata, Oscar, 2024. "Renewable energy and well-being in remote Indigenous communities of Canada: A panel analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; Resource development; 3-Player bargaining experiment; Veto; Indigenous peoples;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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