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In the Shadow of Coase

Author

Listed:
  • Kevin Berry

    (Institute of Social and Economic Reesarch, Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage)

  • Anthony R. Delmond

    (The University of Tennessee at Martin)

  • Rémi Morin Chassé

    (University of Quebec at Chicoutimi)

  • John C. Strandholm

    (University of South Carolina Upstate)

  • Jason F. Shogren

    (Department of Economics, University of Wyoming)

Abstract

We explore how three parties bargain over a public good created by development on only one party’s property. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With weak rights, parties reimburse costs and divide surplus so the developer is indifferent.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Berry & Anthony R. Delmond & Rémi Morin Chassé & John C. Strandholm & Jason F. Shogren, 2018. "In the Shadow of Coase," Working Papers 2018-03, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ala:wpaper:2018-03
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA201803.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Chen, Chau-Nan & Tsaur, Tien-Wang & Rhai, Tong-Shieng, 1982. "The Gini Coefficient and Negative Income," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 473-478, November.
    3. Fréchette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(2), pages 221-232, May.
    4. Cherry, Todd L. & Shogren, Jason F., 2008. "Self-interest, sympathy and the origin of endowments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 69-72, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public good; bargaining; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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