IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecanpo/v83y2024icp359-377.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

CEO “anomaly” compensation incentives and financial investment: Evidence from the SOEs of China

Author

Listed:
  • Tian, Erxia
  • Zhong, Meihua
  • Sun, Mengna
  • Ma, Dong

Abstract

The theory of compensation incentive suggests that matching management positions with appropriate compensation is conducive to improving the efficiency of corporate production and operations. However, within the backdrop of China's institutional framework, the pay restriction policy for executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has led to a phenomenon known as pay-position upside down, which goes against the compensation incentive theory. This paper explores how this phenomenon affects financial investment from the standpoint of the profit-seeking incentive of pursuing political promotions and the rational economic man's motivation to flee accountability for performance evaluations. Our difference-in-differences estimations show that the CEO pay-position upside down has a positive effect on financial investment. Mechanistic analyses show that this link is strengthened by SOEs undergoing mixed reform, SOEs in the provinces inspected by the Central Inspection Team, and SOEs in situations where CEOs are younger and hold shorter tenures. Additionally, the central SOEs' inclination to pursue political promotions and handle performance reviews results in increased investment in financial assets. The findings of this study offer a new perspective on how to use compensation contracts for management incentives effectively and provide valuable insights into the rational arrangement of compensation and positions within state-owned enterprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Tian, Erxia & Zhong, Meihua & Sun, Mengna & Ma, Dong, 2024. "CEO “anomaly” compensation incentives and financial investment: Evidence from the SOEs of China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 359-377.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:83:y:2024:i:c:p:359-377
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2024.06.021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592624001607
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.eap.2024.06.021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xiaping Cao & Michael Lemmon & Xiaofei Pan & Meijun Qian & Gary Tian, 2019. "Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between Pay and Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 2947-2965, July.
    2. Demir, FIrat, 2009. "Financial liberalization, private investment and portfolio choice: Financialization of real sectors in emerging markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 314-324, March.
    3. Wang, Xun, 2022. "Financial liberalization and the investment-cash flow sensitivity," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    4. Bai, Chong-En & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2005. "Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 517-539, September.
    5. Zhi Wang & Qinghua Zhang & Li-An Zhou, 2020. "Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(5), pages 897-911, December.
    6. Liang, Shangkun & Niu, Yuhao & Xin, Fu & Jiang, Lixian, 2024. "CEO foreign experience and corporate financial investment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 929-946.
    7. Shirley, Mary M & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2001. "Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 168-200, April.
    8. Kose John & Lubomir Litov & Bernard Yeung, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1679-1728, August.
    9. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    10. Chen, Shimin & Sun, Zheng & Tang, Song & Wu, Donghui, 2011. "Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 259-271, April.
    11. Yaoqin Li & Xixiong Xu & Yushu Zhu & Mamiza Haq, 2021. "CEO decision horizon and corporate R&D investments: an explanation based on managerial myopia and risk aversion," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(4), pages 5141-5175, December.
    12. Feng, Qianbin & Hu, Xiao & Deng, Xinyi & Lu, Jun, 2023. "Anti-corruption campaign and capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises: Evidence from China’s central committee inspection," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 319-346.
    13. Jin, Xiao Meng & Mai, Yong & Cheung, Adrian Wai Kong, 2022. "Corporate financialization and fixed investment rate: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    14. Custódio, Cláudia & Metzger, Daniel, 2014. "Financial expert CEOs: CEO׳s work experience and firm׳s financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 125-154.
    15. Diane K Denis & Torsten Jochem & Anjana Rajamani & Wei Jiang, 2020. "Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(7), pages 3130-3173.
    16. Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Restricting CEO pay," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1200-1220, September.
    17. Bai, Chong-En & Li, David D. & Tao, Zhigang & Wang, Yijiang, 2000. "A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 716-738, December.
    18. René M. Stulz, 1996. "Rethinking Risk Management," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(3), pages 8-25, September.
    19. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    20. Mobbs, Shawn & Raheja, Charu G., 2012. "Internal managerial promotions: Insider incentives and CEO succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1337-1353.
    21. Zhiyang Hui & Hongyan Fang, 2023. "Government controlling ownership and CEO compensation incentives: evidence from China," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(31), pages 3561-3579, July.
    22. Donohoe, Michael P., 2015. "The economic effects of financial derivatives on corporate tax avoidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 1-24.
    23. Li, Pei & Lu, Yi & Wang, Jin, 2016. "Does flattening government improve economic performance? Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 18-37.
    24. Kong, Dongmin & Wang, Li & Wang, Maobin, 2017. "Effects of anti-corruption on firm performance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 190-195.
    25. Yiming Hu & Wen Li & Aiping Zhang, 2023. "Political Promotion Incentives and Firm Risk: Evidence from State-owned Enterprises in China," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(1), pages 156-169, January.
    26. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Alexey Levkov, 2010. "Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1637-1667, October.
    27. Kong, Gaowen & Zhang, Hui & Wang, Di & Yang, Zhiqing & Liu, Hua, 2021. "Political promotion and pay gap: Evidence from SOEs in China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 450-460.
    28. Xu, Gang & Yano, Go, 2017. "How does anti-corruption affect corporate innovation? Evidence from recent anti-corruption efforts in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 498-519.
    29. Zhang, Mengtao & Li, Wenwen & Luo, Yalin & Chen, Wenchuan, 2023. "Government audit supervision, financialization, and executives' excess perks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    30. Peter Cebon & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2015. "When Less Is More: The Benefits of Limits on Executive Pay," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(6), pages 1667-1700.
    31. Donghua Chen & Oliver Zhen Li & Shangkun Liang, 2016. "Perk consumption as a suboptimal outcome under pay regulations," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 373-399, October.
    32. Xu Li & Xiuling Li & Zhitao Wang, 2023. "Can Mixed-Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises Restrain Excessive Perquisite Consumption by Executives?," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(3), pages 641-655, February.
    33. Jared Harris, 2009. "What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 147-156, February.
    34. Xinxiang Shi & Mingming Zhuang & Cheng King, 2022. "Getting implicit incentives right in SOEs: research on executive perks in China’s anticorruption movement," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(28), pages 3212-3225, June.
    35. Nandini Gupta, 2005. "Partial Privatization and Firm Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 987-1015, April.
    36. Gong, Cynthia M. & Gong, Pu & Jiang, Mengting, 2023. "Corporate financialization and investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    37. Huang, Kuo-En & Wu, Jih-Hwa & Lu, Shiau-Yun & Lin, Yi-Chia, 2016. "Innovation and technology creation effects on organizational performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 2187-2192.
    38. Zhou, Bing & Dutta, Shantanu & Zhu, Pengcheng, 2020. "CEO tenure and mergers and acquisitions," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    39. Lin, Chen & Lin, Ping & Song, Frank M. & Li, Chuntao, 2011. "Managerial incentives, CEO characteristics and corporate innovation in China's private sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 176-190, June.
    40. Ran Duchin & Thomas Gilbert & Jarrad Harford & Christopher Hrdlicka, 2017. "Precautionary Savings with Risky Assets: When Cash Is Not Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(2), pages 793-852, April.
    41. Sicen Chen & Shuping Lin & Jinli Xiao & Pengdong Zhang, 2022. "Do managers learn from stock prices in emerging markets? Evidence from China," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4-5), pages 377-396, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Feng, Qianbin & Hu, Xiao & Deng, Xinyi & Lu, Jun, 2023. "Anti-corruption campaign and capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises: Evidence from China’s central committee inspection," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 319-346.
    2. Boubaker, Sabri & Liu, Pei-Zhi & Ren, Yi-Shuai & Ma, Chao-Qun, 2024. "Do anti-corruption campaigns affect corporate environmental responsibility? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    3. Ren, Xiaoyi & Shao, Huan, 2022. "Non-state shareholder governance and shadow banking business: Evidence from Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Chenli Yin & Dan Li & Maria Paz Salmador, 2022. "Institutional change of compensation policy and its impact on CEO turnover and firm performance," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(8), pages 2527-2552, November.
    5. Leng, Tiecheng & Liu, Ying & Xiao, Yi & Hou, Chunxiao, 2023. "Does firm financialization affect optimal real investment decisions? Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Zhongbo Jing & Shiyu Lu & Yang Zhao & Jun Zhou, 2023. "Economic policy uncertainty, corporate investment decisions and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S1), pages 1477-1502, April.
    7. Song, Simiao & Wang, Fan & Liu, Xia, 2024. "Impact of the regional financial reform on corporate financialization: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA).
    8. Chen, Yan & Sun, Ruiqi, 2023. "Corporate financialization and the long-term use of short-term debt: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PD).
    9. Liao, Yinchao & Wang, Jun & Liao, Wenru & Shu, Xiaoyang & Li, Zhiyong, 2024. "Buffer or substitute? Corporate financialization and leverage manipulation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    10. Zhu, Ling & Liu, Shasha & Kong, Dongmin, 2023. "Governments' fiscal stress and firm decentralization," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    11. Shu, Jiaxian & Zhang, Chengsi & Zheng, Ning, 2020. "Financialization and sluggish fixed investment in Chinese real sector firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1106-1116.
    12. Dr Alex Bryson & John Forth, 2012. "CEO Bonding: Who Posts Performance Bonds and Why?," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 389, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    13. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Ke Guo & Xuemeng Guo & Jun Zhang, 2023. "Financial asset allocation duality and enterprise upgrading: empirical evidence from the Chinese A-share market," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, December.
    15. Wang, Jinbo & Ran, Maosheng & Huang, Qing & Li, Wanli, 2022. "Nationalization of private enterprises and default risk: Evidence from mixed-ownership reform in China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 534-553.
    16. Pan, Xia & Cheng, Wenyin & Gao, Yuning, 2022. "The impact of privatization of state-owned enterprises on innovation in China: A tale of privatization degree," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    17. Cheng, Xu & Kong, Dongmin & Kong, Gaowen, 2022. "Foreign institutional investors and executive compensation incentives: Evidence from China," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    18. Zhou, Mengling & Wang, Bing & Chen, Zhongfei, 2020. "Has the anti-corruption campaign decreased air pollution in China?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    19. Gong, Cynthia M. & Gong, Pu & Jiang, Mengting, 2023. "Corporate financialization and investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    20. Zhao, Renjie & Chen, Jie & Feng, Chen & Zhong, Shihu, 2020. "The impact of anti-corruption measures on land supply and the associated implications: The case of China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:83:y:2024:i:c:p:359-377. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economic-analysis-and-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.