IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2781.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Li, David
  • Bai, Chong-En
  • Tao, Zhigang
  • Wang, Yijiang

Abstract

During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net for the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit incentives have little incentive to promote social stability due to its public good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their role in providing social welfare. Charged with the multi-tasks of efficient production as well as social welfare provision, SOEs continue to be given low profit incentives and consequently, their financial performance continues to be poor.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, David & Bai, Chong-En & Tao, Zhigang & Wang, Yijiang, 2001. "A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 2781, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2781
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP2781
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Murrell Peter & Wang Yijiang, 1993. "When Privatization Should Be Delayed: The Effect of Communist Legacies on Organizational and Institutional Reforms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 385-406, June.
    2. Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1993. "Why China's economic reforms differ: the M‐form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non‐state sector," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(2), pages 135-170, June.
    3. M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
    4. Yingyi Qian, 1996. "Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(2), pages 427-447, October.
    5. Gérard Roland & Thierry Verdier, 1999. "Transition and the output fall," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 1-28, March.
    6. Kreps,David M. & Wallis,Kenneth F. (ed.), 1997. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589819, January.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    8. Castanheira, Micael & Roland, Gerard, 2000. "The Optimal Speed of Transition: A General Equilibrium Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 219-239, February.
    9. Chong‐En Bai & Zhigang Tao, 2000. "Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public‐Good Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 85-113, March.
    10. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 291-300, March.
    11. Castanheira, Micael & Roland, Gérard, 1996. "Restructuring and Capital Accumulation in Transition Economies: A General Equilibrium Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Bai, Chong-En & Li, David D. & Tao, Zhigang & Wang, Yijiang, 2000. "A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 716-738, December.
    13. Bai, Chong-en & Wang, Yijiang, 1998. "Bureaucratic Control and the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 41-61, March.
    14. Kreps,David M. & Wallis,Kenneth F. (ed.), 1997. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589833, January.
    15. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766.
    16. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1996. "Transition as a process of large‐scale institutional change," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(1), pages 1-30, May.
    17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    18. Gary H. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski, 1994. "Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 47-70, Spring.
    19. Woo, Wing Thye & Fan, Gang & Hai, Wen & Jin, Yibiao, 1993. "The efficiency and macroeconomic consequences of Chinese enterprise reform," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 153-168.
    20. Bai, Chong-en & Li, David D. & Wang, Yijiang, 1997. "Enterprise Productivity and Efficiency: When Is Up Really Down?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 265-280, June.
    21. Gordon, Roger H. & Li, David D., 1999. "The effects of wage distortions on the transition:: Theory and evidence from China," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 163-183, January.
    22. Kreps,David M. & Wallis,Kenneth F. (ed.), 1997. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589826, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nauro F. Campos & Abrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 793-836, September.
    2. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    3. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 796-817, December.
    4. Thorsten Beck & Luc Laeven, 2006. "Institution building and growth in transition economies," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 157-186, June.
    5. Amirah El-Haddad, 2013. "Political Patronage and Economic Opportunity: The Case of Vertical Integration in the Egyptian Clothing Industry," Working Papers 797, Economic Research Forum, revised Nov 2013.
    6. Sandeep Mohapatra & Rachael Goodhue & Scott Rozelle, 2008. "Incentive Complementarity in China’s Rural Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 33(1), pages 63-79, August.
    7. Amirah El-Haddad, 2008. "Vertical Integration and Institutional Constraints on Firm Behavior: The Case of the Garment Industry in Egypt," Working Papers 383, Economic Research Forum, revised 01 Jan 2008.
    8. Gerard Rpland, 2001. "The Political Economy of Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 413, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    9. Robert Gibbons, 2005. "Incentives Between Firms (and Within)," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 2-17, January.
    10. Yang, Qing Gong & Temple, Paul, 2012. "Reform and competitive selection in China: An analysis of firm exits," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 286-299.
    11. Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li & Joanne Roberts, 2001. "Why do Governments Privatize," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 429, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    12. Randolph Luca Bruno, 2003. "Speed of Transition, Unemployment Dynamics and Nonemployment Policies: Evidence from the Visegrad Countries," LEM Papers Series 2003/23, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    13. Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2005. "Agricultural transformation: Lessons from experience," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 44(1), pages 1-20, March.
    14. Ichiro Iwasaki & Taku Suzuki, 2016. "Radicalism Versus Gradualism: An Analytical Survey Of The Transition Strategy Debate," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 807-834, September.
    15. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers 034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. Brixiova, Zuzana & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1997. "Private sector development in transition economies," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 241-279, June.
    17. Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 2004. "A General Test of Gaming," CEPR Discussion Papers 4514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Nobuo Yoshida, 2000. "The Optimal Combination of Corruption Reforms: Is a Comprehensive Approach a Good Idea?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1335, Econometric Society.
    19. Bischoff, Ivo, 2002. "Efficiency-Enhancing Effects Of Private And Collective Enterprises In Transitional China," Discussion Papers 26467, University of Giessen, Center for International Development and Environmental Research.
    20. Geir Asheim & Carl Claussen & Tore Nilssen, 2006. "Majority voting leads to unanimity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 91-110, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment; dual-track reform; multi-task; social stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P23 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2781. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.