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Investment decisions in finite-lived monopolies

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  • Pereira, Paulo J.
  • Rodrigues, Artur

Abstract

This paper studies the value and optimal timing for investment in finite-lived monopolies, extending the literature on real option games by considering the cases of random and certain-lived monopolies. Under these settings, firms face the risk of demonopolization, that can occur as a random or a certain event. We show that these new settings produce significantly different results when compared to the canonical monopolistic and duopolistic models. In a certain-lived monopoly, the leader invests sooner than in a duopoly if there is a risk of being preempted, and later than in a monopoly if the leader role is pre-assigned. In a random-lived monopoly, entry occurs somewhere between the duopoly and monopoly cases. Higher uncertainty delays investment in all cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Pereira, Paulo J. & Rodrigues, Artur, 2014. "Investment decisions in finite-lived monopolies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 219-236.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:46:y:2014:i:c:p:219-236
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.07.003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Alcino Azevedo & Dean Paxson, 2018. "Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 271(2), pages 319-355, December.
    3. Ferreira, Ricardo M. & Pereira, Paulo J., 2021. "A dynamic model for venture capitalists’ entry–exit investment decisions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(2), pages 779-789.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C73; D43; D81; D92; G31; G38; Finite-lived monopolies; Real option games; Uncertainty; Real Options;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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