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CEO retirement compensation: Is inside debt excess compensation or a risk management tool?

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  • Reid, Colin D.

Abstract

CEOs face constant scrutiny over their compensation packages. This scrutiny has only intensified amid discussions of CEO-to-employee pay ratios and income inequality nationwide. CEO retirement packages are criticized as camouflage compensation used to award excessive compensation to CEOs and were, prior to 2006, less transparent than they are now. Thanks to the transparent disclosures now required by the SEC, we have a better understanding of the types and amounts of compensation owed to CEOs after they depart or retire, termed inside debt. I investigate whether all CEO inside debt components share similar incentive effects and offers some thoughts on how companies might structure these packages to be most effective. I discuss the structure and incentive effects of the two primary components of inside debt: deferred compensation and supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs). I explain why inside debt, particularly CEO SERPs, may actually help companies manage firm risk. Finally, I outline the best ways to structure inside debt so that it functions as a resource to manage firm risk and foster a long-term perspective rather than mirroring the incentive effect of equity, increasing risk, and encouraging a myopic focus.

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  • Reid, Colin D., 2018. "CEO retirement compensation: Is inside debt excess compensation or a risk management tool?," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 61(5), pages 721-731.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bushor:v:61:y:2018:i:5:p:721-731
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bushor.2018.05.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Revuelto-Taboada, Lorenzo & Duques-Ospina, Marcelo, 2024. "Internal and external determinants of the use of supplementary pension plans in manager compensation," TEC Empresarial, School of Business, Costa Rica Institute of Technology (ITCR), vol. 18(1), pages 84-100.
    3. Tianyi Ma & Minghui Jiang & Xuchuan Yuan, 2019. "Pay Me Later is Not Always Positively Associated with Bank Risk Reduction—From the Perspective of Long-Term Compensation and Black Box Effect," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, December.

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