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BlockCharge: A blockchain-based auction framework for EV charging via mobile stations

Author

Listed:
  • Husain, Zainab
  • El-Fouly, Tarek H.M.
  • Singh, Shakti
  • Mizouni, Rabeb
  • Otrok, Hadi
  • El-Saadany, Ehab

Abstract

The number of Electric Vehicles (EVs) on the road has steadily grown in the past decade in response to an urgent call to reduce carbon emissions. This growth must be accompanied by robust charging solutions to relieve range anxiety in EV drivers, especially in long-haul routes with little to no infrastructural support outside of cities. Mobile Charging Stations (MCS) deployed on trucks are becoming a popular solution in such scenarios. However, incorporating MCS in the EV energy trade market faces three main challenges: (1) an efficient allocation of MCS, (2) ensuring truthfulness in energy price bidding to avoid price inflation, and 3) ensuring secure, transparent transactions without compromising the security of the participants. To tackle these problems, a zone-distributed auction framework is proposed that can be deployed on smart contracts, providing a well-rounded solution for EV owners to avail energy from a fleet of MCS. In this work, a Repeated Single-Minded Auction (R-SMB) model is used, where the MCS bid to earn the right to serve charging requests received in their proximity. With each round of allocation, the approach allows for path planning of the deployed MCS while also controlling foul play with the energy prices in the local market through the competition incorporated by the auctions. Furthermore, the smart contract implementation of the framework ensures a trusted and transparent execution of the auction, MCS allocation as well as payment completion. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated against the optimal Vickrey–Clarke–Grove (VCG) auction to prove its viability.

Suggested Citation

  • Husain, Zainab & El-Fouly, Tarek H.M. & Singh, Shakti & Mizouni, Rabeb & Otrok, Hadi & El-Saadany, Ehab, 2025. "BlockCharge: A blockchain-based auction framework for EV charging via mobile stations," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 377(PC).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:appene:v:377:y:2025:i:pc:s030626192402021x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.124638
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    References listed on IDEAS

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