IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/apmaco/v463y2024ics0096300323005192.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of asymmetric punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Guo, Tian
  • Du, Chunpeng
  • Shi, Lei

Abstract

The role of costly punishment in shaping the evolution of cooperation has long been a subject of debate, given its contested effectiveness due to challenges posed by second-order free-riders and antisocial punishment. However, these conclusions have predominantly arisen from scenarios characterized by symmetry, where individuals possess the ability to mutually impose punishment. In this study, we delve into the impact of asymmetric punishment on the development of cooperation within interdependent networks. Notably, our approach involves the exclusive application of punishment between players situated on different network layers, with no punitive interactions occurring within the same network layer. A critical distinction lies in the fact that punitive authority resides solely with the upper-layer players, while the reverse is not true. Specifically, we investigate two modes of punishment: (i) pro-social punishment, where cooperators penalize defectors, and (ii) anti-social punishment, wherein defectors penalize cooperators. Through extensive numerical simulations, we unveil a synchronization phenomenon of strategies within the two networks when the costs of punishment are comparatively high. This synchronization gives rise to the gradual emergence of cooperative clusters, resulting in higher payoffs for the individuals involved. Conversely, when punishment costs are relatively low, the synchronization phenomenon does not manifest, and the evolution of cooperation takes a divergent course. In summary, our findings enrich the theory of punishment by underscoring the pivotal role played by asymmetric punishment in molding cooperative behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Tian & Du, Chunpeng & Shi, Lei, 2024. "Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of asymmetric punishment," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 463(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:463:y:2024:i:c:s0096300323005192
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2023.128350
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300323005192
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.amc.2023.128350?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Szolnoki, Attila & Perc, Matjaž & Danku, Zsuzsa, 2008. "Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(8), pages 2075-2082.
    2. Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak, 2008. "Winners don’t punish," Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7185), pages 348-351, March.
    3. He, Zhixue & Geng, Yini & Shen, Chen & Shi, Lei, 2020. "Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    4. Liu, Linjie & Chen, Xiaojie, 2022. "Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 425(C).
    5. Du, Chunpeng & Guo, Keyu & Lu, Yikang & Jin, Haoyu & Shi, Lei, 2023. "Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    6. Liu, Yifan & Geng, Yini & Du, Chunpeng & Hu, Kaipeng & Shen, Chen & Pansini, Riccardo & Shi, Lei, 2021. "The interface of unidirectional rewards: Enhanced cooperation within interdependent networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 402(C).
    7. Imhof, Lorens & Nowak, Martin & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?," Scholarly Articles 3200671, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Francisco C. Santos & Marta D. Santos & Jorge M. Pacheco, 2008. "Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games," Nature, Nature, vol. 454(7201), pages 213-216, July.
    9. James H. Fowler, 2005. "Second-order free-riding problem solved?," Nature, Nature, vol. 437(7058), pages 8-8, September.
    10. Deng, Xinyang & Zhang, Zhipeng & Deng, Yong & Liu, Qi & Chang, Shuhua, 2016. "Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 284(C), pages 322-331.
    11. Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd, 2004. "Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem," Nature, Nature, vol. 432(7016), pages 499-502, November.
    12. Jörg Gross & Carsten K. W. Dreu, 2019. "The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    13. Dirk Helbing & Attila Szolnoki & Matjaž Perc & György Szabó, 2010. "Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(4), pages 1-9, April.
    14. Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2010. "Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 689-702, March.
    15. Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd & Samuel Bowles & Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath, 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale Societies," Working Papers 01-01-007, Santa Fe Institute.
    16. Sarah Mathew, 2017. "How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 578-581, May.
    17. Johannes Lohse & Israel Waichman, 2020. "The effects of contemporaneous peer punishment on cooperation with the future," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, December.
    18. Chen, Xiaojie & Fu, Feng & Wang, Long, 2008. "Promoting cooperation by local contribution under stochastic win-stay-lose-shift mechanism," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(22), pages 5609-5615.
    19. David G. Rand & Martin A. Nowak, 2011. "The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 2(1), pages 1-7, September.
    20. Chunpeng Du & Danyang Jia & Libin Jin & Lei Shi, 2018. "The impact of neutral reward on cooperation in public good game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 91(10), pages 1-6, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xie, Kai & Liu, Yaojun & Liu, Tingjin, 2024. "Unveiling the masks: Deception and reputation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Su, Ran & Fang, Zhi-Ming & Hao, Qing-Yi & Sheng, Chun & Fu, Yuan-Jiao, 2024. "The evolution of cooperation affected by unidirectional acceptability mechanism on interdependent networks," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luo-Luo Jiang & Matjaž Perc & Attila Szolnoki, 2013. "If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-7, May.
    2. Chang, Shuhua & Zhang, Zhipeng & Wu, Yu’e & Xie, Yunya, 2018. "Cooperation is enhanced by inhomogeneous inertia in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 490(C), pages 419-425.
    3. Flores, Lucas S. & Han, The Anh, 2024. "Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 473(C).
    4. Zhuang, Qian & Wang, Dong & Fan, Ying & Di, Zengru, 2012. "Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous population with influential individuals," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(4), pages 1735-1741.
    5. Wang, Xianjia & Ding, Rui & Zhao, Jinhua & Chen, Wenman & Gu, Cuiling, 2022. "Competition of punishment and reward among inequity-averse individuals in spatial public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    6. Saptarshi Pal & Christian Hilbe, 2022. "Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.
    7. Alexander Isakov & David Rand, 2012. "The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 97-109, March.
    8. Pan, Qiuhui & Wang, Lingxiao & Shi, Rongrong & Wang, Huan & He, Mingfeng, 2014. "Spatial modes of cooperation based on bounded rationality," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 415(C), pages 421-427.
    9. Ohdaira, Tetsushi, 2017. "Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 77-83.
    10. Yongkui Liu & Xiaojie Chen & Lin Zhang & Long Wang & Matjaž Perc, 2012. "Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(2), pages 1-8, February.
    11. Ding, Chenxi & Wang, Juan & Zhang, Ying, 2016. "Impact of self interaction on the evolution of cooperation in social spatial dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 393-399.
    12. Wang, Xu-Wen & Nie, Sen & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Wang, Bing-Hong & Chen, Shi-Ming, 2017. "Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 465(C), pages 153-158.
    13. Lee, Hsuan-Wei & Cleveland, Colin & Szolnoki, Attila, 2023. "Group-size dependent synergy in heterogeneous populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    14. Ding, Rui & Wang, Xianjia & Liu, Yang & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2023. "Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks under an external incentive mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    15. Deng, Zhenghong & Ma, Chunmiao & Mao, Xudong & Wang, Shenglan & Niu, Zhenxi & Gao, Li, 2017. "Historical payoff promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-5.
    16. Su, Qi & Li, Aming & Wang, Long, 2017. "Spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game with multiple interactive dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 299-306.
    17. José M Galán & Maciej M Łatek & Seyed M Mussavi Rizi, 2011. "Axelrod's Metanorm Games on Networks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(5), pages 1-11, May.
    18. Perc, Matjaž & Grigolini, Paolo, 2013. "Collective behavior and evolutionary games – An introduction," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-5.
    19. Quan, Ji & Zhang, Xiyue & Chen, Wenman & Tang, Caixia & Wang, Xianjia, 2024. "Reputation-dependent social learning on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 475(C).
    20. Guo, Tian & He, Zhixue & Shi, Lei, 2023. "Self-organization in mobile populations promotes the evolution of altruistic punishment," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 630(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:463:y:2024:i:c:s0096300323005192. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-mathematics-and-computation .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.