IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/eurphb/v91y2018i10d10.1140_epjb_e2018-90052-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of neutral reward on cooperation in public good game

Author

Listed:
  • Chunpeng Du

    (School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics)

  • Danyang Jia

    (School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics)

  • Libin Jin

    (School of Statistics and Mathematics, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance)

  • Lei Shi

    (School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

The free-rider behavior is widespread in the system, which will not only lead to social dilemma, and even make the entire system collapse. In order to overcome this complex problem, scientists have done a strenuous endeavor. The public goods game is significant for the study of cooperative behavior among complex interactive social system. And much attention has been paid to the proposal of reward and punishment system. Although people always want to reward cooperative behavior in many cases, antisocial behavior is also common in complex human and biological communities, and free-riders may be rewarded, especially without their information. Therefore, we study the public good game with neutral reward in order to explore the evolution of cooperation. In our public good game, individuals with a few strategies reward other individuals with most strategies in a same group, and the dominant players will receive a fixed bonus provide by other vulnerable players. We show that increasing the bonus will directly promote cooperation and resolve the social dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Chunpeng Du & Danyang Jia & Libin Jin & Lei Shi, 2018. "The impact of neutral reward on cooperation in public good game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 91(10), pages 1-6, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:91:y:2018:i:10:d:10.1140_epjb_e2018-90052-6
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2018-90052-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1140/epjb/e2018-90052-6
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1140/epjb/e2018-90052-6?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Tian & Du, Chunpeng & Shi, Lei, 2024. "Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of asymmetric punishment," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 463(C).
    2. Zhenghong Wu & Yang Sun, 2022. "How to Treat Gossip in Internet Public Carbon Emission Reduction Projects?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-16, October.
    3. Gao, Bo & Liu, Xuan & Lan, Zhong-Zhou & Hong, Jie & Zhang, Wenguang, 2021. "The evolution of cooperation with preferential selection in voluntary public goods game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 584(C).
    4. Kabir, K.M. Ariful & Shahidul Islam, MD & Utsumi, Shinobu & Tanimoto, Jun, 2023. "The emergence of rich complex dynamics in a spatial dyadic game with resource storage, participation cost, and agent interaction propensity," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 175(P1).
    5. Zheng, Junjun & Ren, Tianyu & Ma, Gang & Dong, Jinhui, 2021. "The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 394(C).
    6. Jinzhuo Liu & Mao Peng & Yunchen Peng & Yong Li & Chen Chu & Xiaoyu Li & Qing Liu, 2021. "Effects of inequality on a spatial evolutionary public goods game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(8), pages 1-7, August.
    7. Quan, Ji & Zhang, Xiyue & Chen, Wenman & Tang, Caixia & Wang, Xianjia, 2024. "Reputation-dependent social learning on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 475(C).
    8. Zhu, Zhewen & Dong, Yuting & Lu, Yikang & Shi, Lei, 2021. "Information exchange promotes and jeopardizes cooperation on interdependent networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 569(C).
    9. Guang Zhang & Nan He & Yanxia Dong, 2021. "A Proportional-Egalitarian Allocation Policy for Public Goods Problems with Complex Network," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(17), pages 1-12, August.
    10. Gao, Bo & liu, Xuan & Hou, Shuxia & Jia, Danyang & Du, Mingjing, 2019. "Resolving public goods dilemma by giving the poor more support," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 362(C), pages 1-1.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Statistical and Nonlinear Physics;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:91:y:2018:i:10:d:10.1140_epjb_e2018-90052-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.