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Second-order free-riding problem solved?

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  • James H. Fowler

    (University of California at Davis)

Abstract

Arising from: K. Panchanathan & R. Boyd Nature 432, 499–502 (2004); K. Panchanathan & R. Boyd reply Panchanathan and Boyd1 describe a model of indirect reciprocity in which mutual aid among cooperators can promote large-scale human cooperation without succumbing to a second-order free-riding problem2 (whereby individuals receive but do not give aid). However, the model does not include second-order free riders as one of the possible behavioural types. Here I present a simplified version of their model to demonstrate how cooperation unravels if second-round defectors enter the population, and this shows that the free-riding problem remains unsolved.

Suggested Citation

  • James H. Fowler, 2005. "Second-order free-riding problem solved?," Nature, Nature, vol. 437(7058), pages 8-8, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:437:y:2005:i:7058:d:10.1038_nature04201
    DOI: 10.1038/nature04201
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    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Hsuan-Wei & Cleveland, Colin & Szolnoki, Attila, 2024. "Supporting punishment via taxation in a structured population," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    2. Anwar Shah & Karim Khan & Muhammad Zubair, 2019. "Moral Hazard, Monitoring and Punishment: Evidence from a Field Experiment," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 58(2), pages 109-134.
    3. Bindewald, Eckart & Atallah, Shady S., 2017. "Achieving multiple goals via voluntary efforts and motivation asymmetry," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 354(C), pages 37-48.
    4. Guo, Tian & He, Zhixue & Shi, Lei, 2023. "Self-organization in mobile populations promotes the evolution of altruistic punishment," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 630(C).
    5. Guo, Tian & Du, Chunpeng & Shi, Lei, 2024. "Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of asymmetric punishment," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 463(C).
    6. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Stranlund, John K. & Spraggon, John M., 2017. "Deterring poaching of a common pool resource," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 254-276.
    7. Luo-Luo Jiang & Matjaž Perc & Attila Szolnoki, 2013. "If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-7, May.
    8. Liu, Jia & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Zhang, Ruike, 2020. "Firing the right bullets: Exploring the effectiveness of the hired-gun mechanism in the provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 222-243.
    9. Dirk Helbing & Attila Szolnoki & Matjaž Perc & György Szabó, 2010. "Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(4), pages 1-9, April.

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