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Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with dynamic resource allocation: A fairness preference perspective

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  • Huang, Yongchao
  • Ren, Tianyu
  • Zheng, Junjun
  • Liu, Wenyi
  • Zhang, Mengshu

Abstract

Exploring the conditions under which cooperation can emerge in populations has long been a subject for humans. Fair preference psychology has been incorporated into the analytical framework of the public goods game. Based on considering the dynamic update of trust-driven investment willingness, we introduce a dynamic payoff allocation mechanism and loners to traditional PGG, explaining how the mechanism related to fairness preferences promotes cooperation. We assume that payoffs are equally allocated among players when the payoffs do not exceed the threshold. Otherwise, the excess portion is proportionally allocated according to the investment willingness of cooperators. The effects of parameter changes on the evolution of cooperation are investigated by conducting Monte Carlo simulations. The results show that introducing dynamic payoff allocation and loners can effectively promote cooperation in a specific range of parameters. Specifically, the existence of loners is a double-edged sword. Loners can prevent players from adopting defection behaviors on a large scale when the payoff of cooperation is unsatisfied and inhibit the emergence and diffusion of cooperative strategies as the payoff of cooperators increases. When the payoff of cooperation is dissatisfactory, the dynamic payoff allocation mechanism can promote the average investment willingness of cooperators to accelerate the spread of cooperation. However, the payoff reallocation coefficient should not be set too high, and a high-level threshold of payoff reallocation may lead to the failure of the dynamic payoff allocation mechanism. There is an optimal payoff reallocation coefficient to maximize the efficiency of the proposed mechanism. Moreover, the optimal payoff reallocation coefficient that can maximize the cooperation level is distinct for the diverse combination of enhancement factor and loss aversion coefficient. However, its value should be set at a low level in general. These results may help researchers better understand the evolution of cooperation in public goods games with dynamic resource allocation from a fairness preference perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Yongchao & Ren, Tianyu & Zheng, Junjun & Liu, Wenyi & Zhang, Mengshu, 2023. "Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with dynamic resource allocation: A fairness preference perspective," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 445(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:445:y:2023:i:c:s0096300323000139
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2023.127844
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