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Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market

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  • Ueda, Masahiko

Abstract

We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and totally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player satisfies some conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ueda, Masahiko, 2020. "Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 386(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:386:y:2020:i:c:s0096300320304963
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2020.125540
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Nielsen, Lars Tyge, et al, 1990. "Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1235-1239, September.
    6. Robin Hanson, 2007. "Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation," Journal of Prediction Markets, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 1(1), pages 3-15, February.
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