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Using auction mechanisms to reveal costs for water quality improvements in Great Barrier Reef catchments in Australia

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  • Rolfe, John
  • Windle, Jill

Abstract

There is increasing interest in the use of market-based instruments such as tenders and trading systems to address water quality issues. While the focus is typically on the improvements in resource allocation that are generated, these instruments also play an important role in addressing issues of asymmetric information. The use of water quality tenders to reveal the opportunity costs of changing agricultural practices can help policy makers to understand the potential costs of misallocating public resources and to design better ways of achieving water quality improvements. This role of water quality tenders to reveal opportunity costs is demonstrated by reporting four pilot applications to improve water quality into the Great Barrier Reef in Australia. The results demonstrate the potential for opportunity costs to vary substantially between agricultural producers, and across industries, catchments and pollutants. The results from these case studies indicate that the most cost-effective water quality improvements may be generated from the horticulture and dairy sectors. In contrast, the opportunity costs of reducing emissions from the cane and grazing industries appear to be higher.

Suggested Citation

  • Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2011. "Using auction mechanisms to reveal costs for water quality improvements in Great Barrier Reef catchments in Australia," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(4), pages 493-501, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:agiwat:v:98:y:2011:i:4:p:493-501
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    Cited by:

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    2. Stoeckl, Natalie & Farr, Marina & Larson, Silva & Adams, Vanessa M. & Kubiszewski, Ida & Esparon, Michelle & Costanza, Robert, 2014. "A new approach to the problem of overlapping values: A case study in Australia׳s Great Barrier Reef," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 61-78.
    3. De Valck, Jeremy & Rolfe, John, 2019. "Comparing biodiversity valuation approaches for the sustainable management of the Great Barrier Reef, Australia," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 23-31.
    4. Jill Windle & John Rolfe, 2010. "Assessing community values for reducing agricultural emissions to improve water quality and protect coral health in the Great Barrier Reef," Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports 1084, Environmental Economics Research Hub, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2010. "Assessing community values for reducing agricultural emissions to improve water quality and protect coral health in the Great Barrier Reef," Research Reports 107583, Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub.
    6. Schomers, Sarah & Matzdorf, Bettina, 2013. "Payments for ecosystem services: A review and comparison of developing and industrialized countries," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 16-30.
    7. Pirard, Romain & Lapeyre, Renaud, 2014. "Classifying market-based instruments for ecosystem services: A guide to the literature jungle," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 9(C), pages 106-114.
    8. Iftekhar, M.S. & Tisdell, J.G. & Connor, J.D., 2013. "Effects of competition on environmental water buyback auctions," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 59-73.
    9. Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill & McCosker, Kevin & Northey, Adam, 2018. "Assessing cost-effectiveness when environmental benefits are bundled: agricultural water management in Great Barrier Reef catchments," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(3), July.
    10. John Rolfe & Jill Windle & Kevin McCosker & Adam Northey, 2018. "Assessing cost‐effectiveness when environmental benefits are bundled: agricultural water management in Great Barrier Reef catchments," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(3), pages 373-393, July.
    11. Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2016. "Estimating supply functions for agri-environmental schemes: Water quality and the Great Barrier Reef," 2016 Conference (60th), February 2-5, 2016, Canberra, Australia 235510, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    12. Whitten, Stuart M. & Reeson, Andrew & Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2013. "Designing conservation tenders to support landholder participation: A framework and case study assessment," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 82-92.
    13. Rolfe, John & Whitten, Stuart & Windle, Jill, 2017. "The Australian experience in using tenders for conservation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 611-620.

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