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A Note on Equilibrium Uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

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  • Levent Celik
  • Bilgehan Karabay

Abstract

The Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining model predicts a payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which players' equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. In this note, we present a modified version of the Baron-Ferejohn model by introducing veto players and provide a sufficient condition to obtain a truly unique SSPE in terms of payoffs as well as players' equilibrium strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay, 2011. "A Note on Equilibrium Uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp440, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp440
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    File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp440.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
    3. Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
    4. Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren, 2015. "When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 347-389, August.
    5. Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2013. "Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-190.
    6. Baron, David P & Ferejohn, John, 1987. "Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 303-309, May.
    7. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren, 2015. "When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 347-389, August.
    2. Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2013. "Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-190.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multilateral bargaining; equilibrium uniqueness; veto players;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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