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Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium

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  • Sandeep Kapur
  • Allan Timmermann

Abstract

We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund's absolute and relative performance. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the optimal contract subject to the fund manager's participation constraint. We find that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the equilibrium equity premium and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether the participation constraint is binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the increased importance of delegation and relative performance evaluation may lower the equity premium. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1077-1102, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:115:y:2005:i:506:p:1077-1102
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jiang, Hao & Vayanos, Dimitri & Zheng, Lu, 2020. "Tracking biased weights: asset pricing implications of value-weighted indexing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118847, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Luis Opazo & Claudio Raddatz & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015. "Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from Chile," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(3), pages 479-522.
    4. Livio Stracca, 2006. "Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 823-848, December.
    5. Don U. A. Galagedera & John Watson, 2015. "Benchmarking superannuation funds based on relative performance," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(28), pages 2959-2973, June.
    6. Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022. "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(12), pages 3146-3201.
    7. Opazo, Luis & Raddatz, Claudio & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2009. "The long and the short of emerging market debt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5056, The World Bank.
    8. Galagedera, Don U.A. & Watson, John & Premachandra, I.M. & Chen, Yao, 2016. "Modeling leakage in two-stage DEA models: An application to US mutual fund families," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 62-77.
    9. Premachandra, I.M. & Zhu, Joe & Watson, John & Galagedera, Don U.A., 2012. "Best-performing US mutual fund families from 1993 to 2008: Evidence from a novel two-stage DEA model for efficiency decomposition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3302-3317.
    10. David Blake & Alberto G. Rossi & Allan Timmermann & Ian Tonks & Russ Wermers, 2013. "Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 1133-1178, June.
    11. Pablo Solórzano-Taborga & Ana Belén Alonso-Conde & Javier Rojo-Suárez, 2020. "Data Envelopment Analysis and Multifactor Asset Pricing Models," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-18, April.
    12. Claudio Raddatz & Sergio Schmukler, 2013. "Deconstructing Herding: Evidence from Pension Fund Investment Behavior," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 99-126, February.
    13. Cuoco, Domenico & Kaniel, Ron, 2011. "Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 264-296, August.
    14. Johnson, Timothy C., 2016. "Rethinking reversals," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 211-228.
    15. Thomas P. Gehrig & Torben Lütje & Lukas Menkhoff, 2009. "Bonus Payments and Fund Managers' Behavior: Transatlantic Evidence," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 55(3-4), pages 569-594.
    16. Huang, Shiyang & Jiang, Ying & Qiu, Zhigang & Ye, Zhiqiang, 2019. "An equilibrium model of risk management spillover," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.
    17. Michael Sockin & Mindy Z Xiaolan, 2023. "Delegated Learning and Contract Commonality in Asset Management," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(6), pages 1931-1975.
    18. Huang, Shiyang & Qiu, Zhigang & Shang, Qi & Tang, Ke, 2013. "Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and relative performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4107-4119.
    19. Liu, Xiangbo & Qiu, Zhigang & Xiong, Yan, 2013. "VaR constrained asset pricing with relative performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 174-178.
    20. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Patrick De Lamirande & Bruno Lovat, 2011. "Strategic delegation and collusion: Do incentive schemes matter?," LSF Research Working Paper Series 11-02, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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