Relative Performance Evaluation And Project Selection
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DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2491090
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Cited by:
- Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2005.
"Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1077-1102, October.
- Timmermann, Allan & Kapur, Sandeep, 2003. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 4038, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2004. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," Finance 0408001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2004. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," Finance 0408005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0503, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2015.
"CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2155-2184, October.
- Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2006. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 12068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jenter, Dirk & Kanaan, Fadi, 2008. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," Research Papers 1992, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Jenter, Dirk & Kanaan, Fadi, 2015. "CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64421, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(1), pages 105-126, February.
- Tor‐Erik Bakke & Hamed Mahmudi & Ashley Newton, 2020. "Performance peer groups in CEO compensation contracts," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 997-1027, December.
- Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
- Carlos Jiménez-Angueira & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 701-732, May.
- Lewellen, Wilbur G. & Park, Taewoo & Ro, Byung T., 1996. "Self-serving behavior in managers' discretionary information disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 227-251, April.
- An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
- Ge Bai & Ranjani Krishnan, 2016. "Effects of Ambiguous Common Uncertainty on Employee Preference for Relative Performance Contracts," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 6, pages 65-93, December.
- Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hyeng Keun Koo & Gyoocheol Shim & Jaeyoung Sung, 2008. "Optimal Multi‐Agent Performance Measures For Team Contracts," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 649-667, October.
- Albuquerque, Ana, 2009. "Peer firms in relative performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 69-89, October.
- Timmermans, Oscar, 2024. "Cash versus share payouts in relative performance plans," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123696, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Yu, Zeng, 2024. "Essays on incentive contract and corporate finance," Other publications TiSEM 6f66f49e-d710-44f6-943d-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Brian Maruffi & Augustine C. Arize & Manar Awad & John Malindretos & Alfred Verrrios, 2015. "How does CEO Compensation in U.S Corporations Compare with European and British Firms? A Review of the Literature," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(3), pages 114-114, August.
- DeFond, Mark L. & Park, Chul W., 1999. "The effect of competition on CEO turnover1," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 35-56, February.
- Sensoy, Berk A., 2009. "Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 25-39, April.
More about this item
Keywords
Relative performance evaluation; Project selection; Executive compensation; Agency theory;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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