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An Experiment on Waiting Time and Punishing Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Fabio Galeotti

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

We investigate the implications of waiting time on the decision to punish in a power-to-take experiment. We find that (a) waiting reduces the overall probability of destroying and (b) responders destroy more often in response to higher take rates when the waiting time is longer.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Galeotti, 2013. "An Experiment on Waiting Time and Punishing Behavior," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1383-1389.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00160
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I2-P130.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Galeotti, Fabio, 2015. "Do negative emotions explain punishment in power-to-take game experiments?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-14.
    2. Fabio Galeotti, 2013. "On the Robustness of Emotions and Behavior in a Power-to-Take Game Experiment," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Michalis Drouvelis & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Yuta Shimodaira, 2023. "Giving and Costless Retaliation in the Power-to-Take Game," CESifo Working Paper Series 10607, CESifo.
    4. Ronald Bosman & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Frans Van Winden, 2017. "Emotion at Stake—The Role of Stake Size and Emotions in a Power-to-Take Game Experiment in China with a Comparison to Europe," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiment; punishment; waiting time; power-to-take;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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