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International comparison of the remuneration system disclosure

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  • Simona FRANZONI

    (University of Brescia)

Abstract

This research is aimed at assessing whether rules and recommendations adopted in European Countries (France; Germany; Italy; Spain; United Kingdom) and non-European Countries (Canada; Japan; Russia; United States) enable companies to have a regulatory framework as a guarantee of information completeness, so that anyone can, on the one hand, assess if the company is transparency-oriented and, on the other, to facilitate the comparison of remuneration systems with other companies in other European contexts or non-European Countries. Finally, this paper aims to examine how the listed companies, operating in the public utilities sector, have implemented remuneration systems disclosure in the corporate behaviour in order to assess if, European and non-European listed companies surveyed behave in conformity with transparency provisions and assure stakeholders, information completeness.

Suggested Citation

  • Simona FRANZONI, 2010. "International comparison of the remuneration system disclosure," EuroEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 25, pages 35-44, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:dug:journl:y:2010:i:25:p:35-44
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    File URL: http://journals.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/euroeconomica/article/view/629/576
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Fornasari, Tommaso, 2020. "Il ruolo dei comitati di responsabilità sociale nella corporate governance [The Role of CSR Committees in Corporate Governance]," MPRA Paper 111192, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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