High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: Stock-based versus stock option-based compensation
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- R. Andergassen, 2005. "High powered Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior: Stock based versus Stock Option based Compensation," Working Papers 542, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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Cited by:
- Rudy Santore & Martin Tackie, 2013. "Stock option contract design and managerial fraud," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1283-1289.
- Le Maux, Benoît & Necker, Sarah & Rocaboy, Yvon, 2019.
"Cheat or perish? A theory of scientific customs,"
Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
- Benoît LE MAUX & Sarah NECKER & Yvon ROCABOY, 2016. "Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2016-03-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- Benoît Le Maux & Sarah Necker & Yvon Rocaboy, 2019. "Cheat or perish? A theory of scientific customs," Post-Print halshs-02138617, HAL.
- Benoît Le Maux & Sarah Necker & Yvon Rocaboy, 2016. "Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2016-17, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Cheng-Feng Cheng, 2012. "Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 11(1), pages 25-44, June.
- Wu, Yan Wendy, 2011. "Optimal executive compensation: Stock options or restricted stocks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 633-644, October.
- Andergassen, Rainer, 2016. "Managerial compensation, product market competition and fraud," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-15.
- Yin-Hua Yeh & Zih-Heng Lai, 2014. "The Causes and Risk-Taking on the Change of CEO Equity-Based Compensation Structure," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 4(2), pages 30-48, December.
- Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2020. "Managerial compensation as a double-edged sword: Optimal incentives under misreporting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 994-1017.
- Zhu, Chunhui & Zhang, Teng & Li, Shaoyu, 2021. "Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
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Keywords
Executive compensation Executive stock options Restricted stock Fraud Incentives;Statistics
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