Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions: An Economic Theory of the Noble Lie
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DOI: 10.3790/schm.140.1.3
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JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
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