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Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Johannes G. Reiter

    (Harvard University
    Stanford University School of Medicine)

  • Christian Hilbe

    (IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria))

  • David G. Rand

    (Yale University)

  • Krishnendu Chatterjee

    (IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria))

  • Martin A. Nowak

    (Harvard University
    Harvard University)

Abstract

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze “crosstalk” between a player’s concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person’s decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes G. Reiter & Christian Hilbe & David G. Rand & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A. Nowak, 2018. "Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 9(1), pages 1-8, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:9:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1038_s41467-017-02721-8
    DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Cameron Harwick, 2020. "Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions: An Economic Theory of the Noble Lie," Journal of Contextual Economics (JCE) – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 140(1), pages 3-30.
    2. Deming Mao & Xiaoyu Li & Dejun Mu & Dujuan Liu & Chen Chu, 2021. "Separated interactive behaviors promote cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(7), pages 1-9, July.
    3. Quan, Ji & Chen, Xinyue & Wang, Xianjia, 2024. "Repeated prisoner's dilemma games in multi-player structured populations with crosstalk," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 473(C).
    4. Peter S. Park & Martin A. Nowak & Christian Hilbe, 2022. "Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.
    5. Parizad Khezri, 2021. "Developing and Validating an Organizational Forgiveness Measure: An Exploratory Factor Analysis Approach," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 14(9), pages 150-150, July.
    6. Li, Wen-Jing & Chen, Zhi & Jin, Ke-Zhong & Wang, Jun & Yuan, Lin & Gu, Changgui & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Perc, Matjaž, 2022. "Options for mobility and network reciprocity to jointly yield robust cooperation in social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 435(C).
    7. Ma, Xiaojian & Quan, Ji & Wang, Xianjia, 2023. "Evolution of cooperation with nonlinear environment feedback in repeated public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 452(C).
    8. Sun, Chengbin & Luo, Chao, 2020. "Co-evolution of influence-based preferential selection and limited resource with multi-games on interdependent networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 374(C).

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