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Money and its institutional substitutes: the role of exchange institutions in human cooperation

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  • HARWICK, CAMERON

Abstract

This paper offers an increasing returns model of the evolution of exchange institutions building on Smith's dictum that ‘the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market’. Exchange institutions are characterized by a tradeoff between fixed and marginal costs: the effort necessary to execute an exchange may be economized by up-front ‘investment’ in strategies to facilitate the publication and accounting of trading histories. Increases in the size of the exchange network select for higher-fixed-cost exchange institutions, beginning with autarky, through various intermediate stages, and finally to mass monetary exchange. By identifying the relevant fixed costs of money and its institutional substitutes across time, the paper both accounts for the persistence of pre-monetary exchange institutions, despite the ‘inevitability’ of monetary exchange that seems to be a feature of traditional models of the origin of money, and illuminates the forces driving the transition from one to another.

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  • Harwick, Cameron, 2018. "Money and its institutional substitutes: the role of exchange institutions in human cooperation," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 689-714, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:14:y:2018:i:04:p:689-714_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Cameron Harwick, 2020. "Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions: An Economic Theory of the Noble Lie," Journal of Contextual Economics (JCE) – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 140(1), pages 3-30.
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    3. Cameron Harwick, 2019. "Bubbles and Broad Monetary Aggregates: Toward a Consensus Approach to Business Cycles," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 45(2), pages 250-268, April.
    4. Darcy W E Allen & Chris Berg & Sinclair Davidson & Jason Potts, 2021. "Blockchain and investment: An Austrian approach," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 149-162, March.

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