IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cpt/journl/vy2013i132p39-69.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

El impacto de la persecución pública en los juicios de libre competencia en Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Aldo, González

    (Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía,Santiago)

  • Alejandro, Micco

    (Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía,Santiago)

  • Constanza, Caicha

    (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Santiago)

Abstract

The article seeks to measure the impact of the National Economic Prosecution Agency on antitrust trails in Chile. Using trial statistics, considering the timeline from the moment the tribunal was created, the involvement of the economic prosecutor shows an increase of 44 percent on the probability of conviction on an antitrust lawsuit. On the condition that the trial will end up with a ruling, statistics show an increase of 38 percent on the probability of conviction when the economic prosecutor gets involved. The results are robust in showing possible "selection-bias" on the part of the prosecution, something that is so when the Supreme Court gets involved and rules. The article also shows a tendency on the part of the prosecution to get involved in cases of sensitive markets and allegations of collusion. The fact that the indicted is a state institution or its size do not affect the probability of the Prosecution getting involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Aldo, González & Alejandro, Micco & Constanza, Caicha, 2013. "El impacto de la persecución pública en los juicios de libre competencia en Chile," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(132), pages 39-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2013:i:132:p:39-69
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://estudiospublicos.cl/index.php/cep/article/view/266
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://estudiospublicos.cl/index.php/cep/article/view/266/330
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McAfee, R. Preston & Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H., 2008. "Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1863-1875, October.
    2. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 575-612, June.
    3. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    4. Hylton,Keith N., 2003. "Antitrust Law," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521790314, October.
    5. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Hylton,Keith N., 2003. "Antitrust Law," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521793780, October.
    8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aldo González & Alejandro Micco, 2013. "Private vs Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile," Working Papers wp378, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    3. Kryuchkova, P. & Avdasheva, S., 2012. "Public and Private Enforcement of Law under the High Risk of Type I Errors: the Russian Case," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 114-140.
    4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2009. "Public Enforcement of Law," Chapters, in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    6. Alessandro Marra & Alessandro Sarra, 2010. "Incomplete antitrust laws and private actions for damages," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 111-135, October.
    7. Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2018. "How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 143-164, August.
    8. Larcom Shaun & Swanson Timothy, 2015. "Documenting Legal Dissonance: Legal Pluralism in Papua New Guinea," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 25-50, March.
    9. Yang, Der-Yuan, 2008. "On the elements and practices of monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 654-666, March.
    10. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper & spagnolo, giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," Working Paper Series 221, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    12. Vivekananda Mukherjee & Siddhartha Mitra & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2020. "Corruption, Pricing of Public Services, and Entrepreneurship in Economies with Leakage," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(4), pages 595-619.
    13. Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 2000. "Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 319-340, May.
    14. RafaelDi Tella & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2008. "Choosing agents and monitoring consumption: a note on wealth as a corruption-controlling device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1552-1571, October.
    15. Benito Arrunada, 2000. "Audit quality: attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 205-224.
    16. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Rafael Di Tella & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2005. "A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device," Public Economics 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Kirstein, Roland, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    19. Toke S. Aidt, 2016. "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 142-157, June.
    20. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    21. Styhre Alexander, 2018. "The Making of the Shareholder Primacy Governance Model: Price Theory, the Law and Economics School, and Corporate Law Retrenchment Advocacy," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 1-31, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust; public enforcement; private enforcement; litigation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2013:i:132:p:39-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Aldo Mascareño (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepppcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.