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Eigennutz kontra Reziprozität: Befunde und Implikationen

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  • Armin Falk

Abstract

Die in der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung gefundenen systematischen Abweichungen vom Homo Oeconomicus sind von weitreichender Bedeutung: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Modelle bilden nicht nur die Grundlage für unser Verständnis sozialer Realität, sondern auch für die Politikberatung. Folglich hat die in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften vertretene Annahme eines allgegenwärtigen Homo Oeconomicus nicht nur eine erkenntnisleitende Funktion, sondern bestimmt - vermittels Beratung und Sozialisation durch ökonomische Ausbildung - auch das Handeln politischer und unternehmerischer Entscheidungsträger. In dieser Arbeit sind einige Aspekte einer alternativen Wirtschaftspolitik, die sich an den Ergebnissen der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung orientiert, skizziert worden. Der Tenor ist, dass es sich lohnen könnte, zusätzlich zu den aus dem Homo Oeconomicus Ansatz hergeleiteten Standardkonzepten, neue innovative Politikinstrumente zu entwickeln und anzuwenden.

Suggested Citation

  • Armin Falk, 2002. "Eigennutz kontra Reziprozität: Befunde und Implikationen," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 28(3), pages 383-401.
    • Handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2002v:28i:3p:383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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